Open market share repurchases are strictly regulated to prevent companies from profiting from insider information. We examine compliance with these rules in France, where the mandatory disclosure of share repurchases provides detailed information on repurchases actually undertaken. Using a database containing 36,848 repurchases made by 352 French firms over the period 2000-2002, we show that very few firms fully comply with the regulations for all their buybacks. Non-compliance has an adverse effect on liquidity only for the smallest and least liquid firms.
Introduction
Over the last decade, open market share repurchase has become a major corporate payout mechanism for public corporations all around the world (see for example Grullon and Michaely, 2004 , for the U.S., Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 2000 for Canada and Rau and Vermaelen, 2002 , for the UK). To implement these buybacks, managers act directly in the market as investors on behalf of the company. This action puts them in the position of insiders, and thus, their intervention can be costly for investors. For the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Brockman and Chung (2001) find that managers exhibit timing ability and that liquidity deteriorates during repurchase periods. To limit the risk of improper intervention, most countries have regulations for share repurchases to ensure that its shareholder interests are protected, and that the company will not profit from its private information. For instance, repurchases are not allowed when management holds information not disclosed to the market.
There are also regulations to prevent manipulation of stock prices, which can arise when the company has contracts containing optional provisions that depend on share prices. This type of clause is common in mergers and acquisitions, LBOs and management remuneration packages. Restrictions on the quantity of shares repurchased during a given trading day reduce the impact of repurchases on the market price, but it is difficult to determine the level of compliance with these restrictions. The objective of this paper is to assess regulatory compliance in France, where repurchase disclosure is mandatory.
Regulation of share repurchases is an element of a more general trend to eliminate illegal insider trading, when managers, directors, or major shareholders buy or sell shares and are the sole beneficiaries of the transactions. In share repurchases, the decision is made by management, but on behalf of the company. Most developed countries have introduced insider trading regulations Daouk, 2002 and Durnev and Nain, 2005) and there are studies that examine their effectiveness. 1 While detailed regulations have also been established for share repurchases, there are few studies that have analyzed actual compliance with the rules.
2 Companies' disclosures of their total buybacks provide the only basis for verification of compliance, and disclosure requirements vary widely between countries and periods. In this paper, we analyze French businesses' compliance with the main share repurchase rules. Using data from Euronext Paris (the Paris Stock Exchange), we study repurchase regulation compliance on the Paris Stock Exchange for 806 repurchase programs and 36,848
repurchase trading days over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] . First, we examine whether the companies comply with the maximum repurchase price and the maximum percentage of capital for repurchase, as established by shareholders at the annual meeting. We show that most firms comply with these constraints. We also observe that most firms set limits that are greater than the requirements for their share repurchase programs. The few violations we find relate to companies that set limits that are stricter than the average.
We then study two of the main features of French share repurchase regulations, a limit on volume (repurchases must not exceed 25% of the reference volume for each trading day), and a rule prohibiting repurchases during the 15 days preceding publication of earnings results.
We find that 79% of firms violate the volume rule in at least one repurchase day over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] , and 69% break the rule for more than 5% of repurchase days. This finding primarily applies to the smallest and least liquid firms. Only 13.89% of CAC40 companies break the rule for more than 5% of repurchase days. 70% of repurchasing companies bought back stock at least once during a non-trading window, just before announcing their results, and this non-compliance covers a total of 5.64% of repurchase trading days. We conclude that
French publicly traded companies do not always comply with share repurchase regulations, and that violations are particularly frequent for companies listed on the cash-only market.
We then address related issues including whether there are negative consequences of rule violations on equity market liquidity. We analyze the differing impact of repurchases on market liquidity, according to their compliance or non-compliance with regulations and show that firms listed on the cash-only market, which are responsible for most of the regulation violations, are also the companies whose liquidity is most adversely affected by these violations. For companies on the more liquid market segments of the exchange, noncompliance with regulations appears to have little impact on liquidity.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the repurchase regulation environment of the Paris Stock Exchange. In Section 3, we describe the data and methodology. The Section 4 analyzes firms' compliance with the terms of their programs as adopted at the general shareholders' meeting, and external regulations. In the Section 5, we measure the consequences of non-compliance on stock liquidity. Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper.
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Paris repurchase regulation environment

Euronext Paris market structure
Euronext Paris is an electronic limit order market. There are two major mechanisms for trades: one, continuous trading, for the more actively traded stocks, and two, a double auction market for the less liquid stocks. A description can be found in Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1999) . A call auction determines the opening and closing price in the continuous market.
Deferred settlement is possible for a subset of the more liquid shares, that is, the market segment called the "service à réglement différé" or SRD. For all other shares, only cash trading is possible.
Euronext Paris offers substantial transparency. The five best bid/ask limits (price and quantity) in the order book are publicly released and members have access to all orders outstanding in the book, although the identity of the broker is not shown.
Over the period of this study, transactions on a separate regulated block trades market were possible only for a small number of shares. Shares listed on the auction market were not eligible. 6 An ordinary block could be traded within a price range extended to approximately the weighted average price of the five best-price limits. Off-hours transactions are also possible for all shares. Transactions made outside the trading hours are executed at a price within a range of 1% around the last traded price.
Repurchase regulation environment
The law of July 2, 1998 authorizes open market stock repurchases up to the limit of 10% of capital and over a maximum time period of 18 months. The objectives and terms of the open market stock repurchase are defined at the annual general shareholders' meeting. For each 24-month period, subject to authorization by shareholders, shares representing up to 10% of existing capital can be cancelled. Within the 10% limit, firms can also use the acquired shares to grant shares or options to their employees, stabilize stock prices, exchange stocks as part of merger and acquisition transactions, reduce or eliminate dilution related to conversion of convertible bonds, or hold the shares as treasury stock. Once a French company's repurchase program is approved by the shareholders, a registration statement is issued to obtain approval by the AMF. No subsequent announcement of the company's intention to repurchase shares is required before it proceeds with the buybacks.
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In the U.S., the only guide for executing open market repurchases is the SEC's "safe harbor" Rule 10b-18, which describes a code of conduct that, if followed, protects the corporation against share price manipulation charges based on the timing or price of repurchases. It is commonly believed by traders, the SEC, and the stock exchanges that the safe harbor rule is followed by most repurchasing firms (Cook, Krigman and Leach, 2003) .
Rule 10b-18 was modified in December 2003. Although French regulations are broadly similar to those in the U.S., there are some differences. Insert Table 1 here
Data
We use the Euronext intraday database. Our dataset contains a time-stamped record of every transaction and order submitted to the market from January 2000 to December 2002 for 918 French firms. These data include transaction prices, volumes, and the best limits of the order book (bid and ask prices, and bid and ask size), as well as market capitalization. All data are stamped to the nearest second.
We also use data from the AMF, which provides daily repurchases made by any firm listed on the Paris Stock Exchange from January 2000 to December 2002. The data include the name of the repurchasing company, the date, the number of shares repurchased, the share price, and the daily total repurchase value. To be retained in the final sample, we require an exact reported date for the repurchase, a reported repurchase price higher than the minimum and lower than the maximum trading price that day, and a quantity repurchased lower than the total quantity traded on the exchange. Our final sample consists of 352 firms and 36,848
repurchase trading days over the 36-month period of study.
When a French firm plans to repurchase shares, the shareholders' meeting must approve the terms of the repurchase program, and a registration statement must be issued for the information not yet in the public domain.
4.1.Compliance with the content of the registration statement
The registration statement sets forth: We examine whether the repurchases comply with the authorized programs on two points: the maximum percentage capital allowed for repurchases, and the maximum repurchase price. The other points in the registration statement either correspond mechanically (for example the date of the shareholders' meeting or the duration of the authorization), or are difficult to verify against public data (for example the fact that a major shareholder participates in share repurchase, or the financing method).
halshs-00143974, version 1 -6 Jun 2007 Table 4 , panel A, shows the percentage of capital the firm is authorized to repurchase under the approved program, and the percentage of actual repurchases associated with that program. The authorized limit is typically 10% of the capital, which is the maximum allowed by law. On average, the programs set the repurchase limit at 9.13% of capital. This percentage is similar for both markets, amounting to 9.71% for CAC40 companies and 8.97% for cashonly market companies. The program also stipulates the probable percentage repurchased, excluding treasury stock (French firms are prohibited from holding more than 10% of their own shares). The average (median) percent repurchased is 7.02% (7.83%). These authorized repurchase percentages represent a ceiling which firms rarely reach. Average (median) repurchases are 19.48% (7.11%) of the authorized percentage capital. Turning to the authorized repurchase value, i.e. the number of shares the firm is authorized to repurchase multiplied by the maximum purchase price, actual repurchases represent an average (median)
8.86% (3.34%) of the authorized amount. This smaller proportion in value terms is due to the maximum purchase price being generally fixed well above the market price, and the fact that the market was generally declining over the period of our study.
In 17 cases the authorized repurchase percentages were exceeded. Most of these programs (12) involved the smallest cash-only market companies, and only 2 were CAC40 companies.
All "excess" purchases were by companies whose program authorized repurchase of only 4.38% of total shares, on average, which is well below the legal 10% limit and the overall average across all programs, 9.13%. The average percentage repurchased under these 17 programs is 258% of the authorized percentage. Again, excess purchases are mainly concentrated in the programs of firms listed on the cash-only market (307%), whereas for CAC40 companies, the excess is more limited (120% of the authorized percentage).
Based on this first criterion, we conclude that the vast majority of companies comply with the terms of their repurchase program.
In Table 4 , panel B, we analyze the maximum price at which shares can be repurchased over the duration of the program. The maximum price stated in the registration document is adjusted to correct for the effects of stock splits and rights offerings subsequent to the document's issuance date. The maximum repurchase price is set fairly broadly, corresponding to an average of 2.36 times the share price at the date the program is approved, which leaves considerable room for share price rises. On average, the lowest (highest) actual repurchase price is 0.45 (0.62) times the maximum authorized price.
For the full sample, 34 programs (4.22% of the total) have at least one repurchase above the maximum authorized price, mostly concentrated on the cash-only market (30 cases). In
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these 34 programs, an "excess price" purchase took place on average within 13.44 days (43.37% of repurchase days), again mainly on the cash-only market (15 days involving excess price repurchases on average, compared to only one for the two CAC40 companies that exceeded their authorized price). This price limit non-compliance occurs in programs where the ratio of the maximum authorized price to the share price at the program adoption date is significantly lower than the same ratio for companies that comply with the limit (1.59 compared to 2.39). The frequency of price limit violations rises as companies are more restrictive in their program terms.
Our results indicate that most companies comply with the maximum purchase price constraint. However, since the stock market was in decline during the period studied, the price constraint was less restrictive than it would have been in a bullish market.
We conclude that for the above two points the majority of companies respect the criteria set forth in the registration statement approved by the AMF when their share repurchase program is adopted. The few exceptions mainly involve companies that were more restrictive than average in their repurchase authorizations.
Insert table 4 here
Compliance with volume regulations
AMF regulations require that the purpose of companies' trading in their own shares must not be to obstruct normal market operation and mislead third parties. To avoid overestimating non-compliance with the 25% rule, we calculate several ratios, to infer the portion of repurchases executed through the central order book.
-First, we assume that all repurchases are carried out through the central order book, overestimating the portion of repurchases that are central order book transactions. This repurchase/reference volume ratio provides an approximation by excess of the repurchase/reference volume ratio.
-Second, we assume maximum execution through the block trade facility. Repurchases through the central order book correspond to the total repurchases for shares not eligible for block trades, or when the repurchase volume in one trading day is lower than the NBA. When block trades are observed in a day, we consider that they are repurchase transactions and that only repurchases in excess of block trades are executed through the central order book. This calculation underestimates the portion of repurchases made through the central order book and any non-compliance with the 25% rule.
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These two ratios frame the true repurchase/reference volume ratio for trades through the central order book. Insert Table 5 here
The repurchase/reference volume ratio based on the assumption that all repurchases are executed through the central order book (maximum volume ratio) is on average 63.52%. The repurchase/reference volume ratio based on the assumption that a maximum of repurchases are carried out through the block trade facility (minimum volume ratio) is on average 8.75%
for the whole sample. We base our assessment of compliance with the 25% rule using the minimum volume ratio, which is an approximate minimum estimate of the true ratio. Using this low estimate, the 25% volume rule was violated on 8,147 trading days (23% of the total).
The distribution by market shows that the firms with the most non-compliance with the volume rule are the smallest and least liquid firms. For firms listed on the cash-only market, 27.11% of repurchase days violate the volume rule, while for CAC40 (other SRD) companies, only 1.82% (13.81%) of days violate the rule. Non-compliance with the volume rule does not appear to be concentrated in a small number of firms, given that 78.81% of firms do not comply with this rule on at least one repurchase day (52.77% for CAC40 companies, 74.50%
for other SRD companies and 90.03% of firms listed on the cash-only market). But whereas cash-only and non-CAC40 SRD firms are broadly represented (84.19% and 62.74% respectively), only 13.89% of CAC40 firms represent more than 5% of volume rule violations. Thus, non-compliance rate for this rule is high, with only few companies showing full compliance, all the more so as the actual non-compliance rate is higher than the minimum ratio used for our calculations.
Companies that have a liquidity contract with an investment service provider are exempt from the 25% volume rule and trading by the service provider is presumed to be legitimate.
To verify that the excess trades observed do not result from the existence of a liquidity contract, we divide our sample into two periods (before and after liquidity contracts were authorized), and in the second period, into firms with and without a liquidity contract. In the period covered by our study, no CAC40 company had entered into a liquidity contract. We halshs-00143974, version 1 -6 Jun 2007
observe that firms with a liquidity contract break the volume rule less frequently. The noncompliant firms represent 18.15% of firms listed on the cash-only market with a liquidity contract (compared to 30.38% over the same period for firms with no liquidity contract). For non-CAC40 SRD firms, the ratio is 8.69% with a liquidity contract against 13.20% without.
On average, repurchases executed under liquidity contracts are smaller in scale, as their objective is not to accumulate shares. For cash-only market companies, the average total value of shares repurchased on one repurchase day is €7,187 with a liquidity contract compared to €23,336 over the same period without a contract; for SRD companies, €18,393 and €180,778
respectively. However, the volumes traded by companies with a liquidity contract are also small, particularly for SRD firms, measures that the least liquid companies are the most likely to enter into a liquidity contract. Thus, although companies with a liquidity contract are exempt from the volume constraint, they comply with it in proportionately greater numbers.
Our results are robust and provide an approximate minimum estimate of non-compliance rates. These results can be compared to the findings of Cook, Krigman and Leach (2003) , who report that 40.74% of the firms in their sample exceed the legal volume on at least one occasion. The frequency of violation is higher on the Nasdaq than on the NYSE. On the NYSE, violations represent 14% of allowed volume whereas on the Nasdaq, firms repurchase 57% more than the allowed non-block volume for a day. Although the Cook, Krigman and Leach's (2003) results are based on a questionnaire that was answered on a voluntary basis, they find that the non-compliance rate is high. Using data from the French market, we show that the non-compliance rate is considerably higher than their estimate.
Repurchases around annual earnings results announcements
U.S. regulations on share repurchases stipulate that once private information exists, including the annual results, the company has a choice between disclosing or abstaining from repurchasing. French regulations are stricter regarding earnings results announcements, since an issuer must, without exception, abstain from trading its own shares during the 15 calendar days prior to publication of its consolidated financial statements, or annual accounts, and more generally, as in the U.S., as soon as it is in possession of insider information. We are particularly interested in this 15-day period prior to results announcements, which we call the inapplicable to trading activity on behalf of the issuer under a liquidity contract. Over the period of our study, we examine all the publication dates for annual, half-yearly and quarterly results. As in the analysis of compliance with the volume rule, the existence of a liquidity contract must be taken into account, as it generates a presumption of legitimacy for trades by intermediaries during the non-trading windows.
Over our sample period, 1,186 result announcement dates are available for companies that made at least one repurchase. Only dates falling between the first and last date (plus 15 days) of the repurchase program are selected in establishing this total. As our database on Although in terms of the number of repurchase days, the least liquid firms are the most frequent non-trading window violators, their violations involve smaller amounts. The scale of repurchases during non-trading windows as a proportion of total repurchases is higher when the firm is listed on a more liquid market. For the full sample, the value repurchased during a non-trading window is 6% of the total value repurchased, but 6.20% for CAC40 shares, 4.12% for non-CAC40 SRD shares and 2.48% for cash-only market shares. Repurchases during non-trading windows are mainly concentrated close to the announcement date, particularly for companies listed on the most liquid markets. Taking repurchases carried out during the three trading days preceding the result publication date, non-compliant purchases represent 3.22% of total repurchases, and 53.65% of all non-compliant repurchases. For CAC40 companies they total 3.38% (54.58% of non-compliant repurchases), while for cashonly market companies the figure is 0.65% (26.10% of non-compliant repurchases).
While the SEC authorized U.S. firms to repurchase their own shares after September 11,
2001
, granting a presumption of legitimacy, there was no equivalent measure for French companies. Nevertheless, when we examine the repurchases in the period from September 11
to October 15, 2001 (Table 6 , panel B), the violations observed are larger in scale during this period, particularly for CAC40 companies. There were 15.69% of repurchase days in that period that were within a non-trading window (11.28% for CAC40 companies, 18.77% for non-CAC40 SRD companies and 5.51% for cash-only market companies). The impact in value terms is amplified, given that 21.31% of the total amount repurchased during the post- In Table 6 , panel C, we take into account the impact of the existence of a liquidity contract. A company that engages an investment services provider to manage its repurchases under a liquidity contract is exempt from the ban on trading in the period before annual results announcements. We verify that the previous results do not primarily stem from the existence . We split the sample between firms that entered into a liquidity contract during the period and firms that did not. We show that our previous results are robust. Across the full sample, 5.41% of repurchase days were during the non-trading windows prior to the introduction of liquidity contracts. After their introduction, this proportion rises to 7.37% for firms without a liquidity contract and 10.45% for firms with a liquidity contract. These results are largely attributable to firms listed on the cash-only market, where the existence of a liquidity contract results in 10.93% of repurchases taking place during non-trading windows (7.70% of the total value of repurchases) compared to 8.63% of repurchase days (3.64% of the value) over the same period when there was no liquidity contract. Although liquidity contracts bring about an increase in repurchases during non-trading windows for cash-only market companies, this factor alone cannot explain all of our results regarding violation of the non-trading windows. We conclude that a certain number of firms that are required to abstain from trading prior to results announcement in fact violate the non-trading window.
Finally, we divide the sample according to the type of results announced: quarterly, halfyearly, or annual (Table 6, the number of violations observed over the period is far from negligible and we can affirm non compliance with the non-trading window rule.
Non-compliance with regulations and market liquidity
We examine the issue of whether non-compliance with repurchase regulations leads to a deterioration in liquidity for the relevant firm, and higher costs for investors, or whether the impact is neutral. We compare several liquidity measures for compliant repurchase days and non-compliant repurchase days, separating violations of the volume rule from violations of the non-trading window rule. Table 7 reports summary statistics for a range of liquidity measures, divided into tradebased measures and order-based measures for trading days with and without repurchases.
Trade-based measures include the number of trades and the turnover ratio, i.e. the ratio between the capital exchanged during the session and the market capitalization at opening.
Order-based measures include effective relative bid-ask spreads and depths. Depth at opening is measured by the natural logarithm of the sum of the value in Euros of shares posted at the best limits first observed in the order book that trading day. The bid-ask spread at opening is calculated based on the first price and the first spread available for the session immediately after the first price which is an auction price. We also report the average relative effective spread, estimated using full day data records. In this case, the number of spreads over a Insert Table 7 here The results differ according to the share's market and the type of non-compliance. For CAC40 companies, whose non-compliance rate is low, neither the turnover ratio nor the For non-CAC40 SRD companies, whose violation rate, particularly on volume rules, is higher than CAC40 firm rates, no deterioration can be detected in the liquidity indicators, whether depth or spread. However, the results are different for cash-only market firms. The depth is lower, and the spread by any measure increases when the volume rule is broken. The average spread (based on the full day's data record) increases from 0.02589 to 0.0309. Non-compliance with nontrading windows leads to a deterioration in the spread (by any measure), but not in depth.
To verify the robustness of our results, we studied liquidity with reference to the existence or non-existence of a liquidity contract and find that results are the same. A liquidity contract does not affect the impact on liquidity of non-compliance with regulations. We also used a multiple regression to verify that our results were not related to volatility fluctuations or other characteristics of the trading day. The multiple regressions confirm that liquidity deterioration essentially concerns firms listed on the cash-only market and is more sensitive for the volume rule, independent of the other characteristics of the trading day.
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Thus, we conclude that the liquidity on days when firms do not comply with the share repurchase regulations is clearly reduced for cash-only market companies, whose liquidity is low, but liquidity is not greatly affected for more liquid companies.
Conclusion
Although the regulations governing stock repurchases in France are similar to those applicable in the U.S., detected verification of compliance with French regulations is made possible through access to detailed data on the repurchases actually made. We study a large sample of actual share repurchases in France by obtaining access to a private database. We are halshs-00143974, version 1 -6 Jun 2007 thus able to carry out detailed verifications of compliance with the repurchase regulations using actual data rather than only survey data.
We verify that the repurchases complied with the program terms as defined by the shareholders' meeting that authorized the repurchases, comparing the percentage of capital repurchased with the authorized percentage, and the repurchase price with the maximum authorized price. We show that most firms comply with the specifications of their programs, in large part because they generally set very broad limits. For instance, the authorized buyback percentage is often set at the legal maximum, even when the firm's objective is well below that level. Similarly, the maximum repurchase price is often fixed at a high level that is easy to meet.
We also study compliance with the daily repurchase volume regulations (repurchases must remain below 25% of the reference volume for a given day) and the ban on repurchasing stock just before results announcements (no repurchases may take place during the 15 days preceding publication of results). While most repurchases follow these rules, few firms are in total compliance. We find that 79% of firms violate the volume rule in at least one repurchase day, and the violations concern 23% of repurchase days. Moreover, 70% of firms have repurchased shares during a non-trading window at least once, and this concerns 5.5% of trading days. We conclude that firms are not in compliance with regulations governing share repurchases, particularly the smallest and least liquid firms.
Finally, we study the impact on market liquidity of non-compliance with the regulations.
Non-compliance systematically leads to a perceptible deterioration in liquidity for firms listed on the cash-only market, which are the least liquid. But the impact is less clear, and is likely to be neutral for repurchases during non-trading windows, for firms listed on the most liquid market segments. The purchase price must fall within the lowest-highest price interval for the elapsed portion of the trading day.
Price limitations vary depending on whether the security is a "reported," "exchange-traded," "Nasdaq," or "other" security, and whether the bid or purchase is effected on an exchange.
The purchase price must not exceed the highest independent bid or the last independent transaction price, whichever is higher, quoted or reported in the consolidated system. Volume 25% of the security's trading volume (block transactions are excluded)
25% of the security's trading volume (block transactions are excluded).
25% of the security's trading volume (block transactions are included). An amended block exception allows issuers to make one block purchase per week, provided that the issuer does not make any other Rule 10b-18 purchases on that day.
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Trading volume reference period Depending on the market and the period (from 3 days to 30 days before the repurchase day).
Four calendar weeks preceding the repurchase day.
Abstention period 15 days before results announcements or if in possession of non-public information.
If in possession of non-public information, choice of disclosing or abstaining from repurchasing.
If in possession of non-public information, choice of disclosing or abstaining from repurchasing. Disclosure For a given month, at the beginning of the following month.
No disclosure required. For a given quarter, at the beginning of the following quarter, disclosing figures for each month. , including those newly listed or delisted during the period. Shares for which no repurchase program was adopted are classified under "No repurchase program". Those for which a repurchase program was adopted, but no repurchase occurred over the period are classified under "inactive repurchase program", while those for which there was at least one repurchase transaction are classified under "Repurchase". The averages of all daily observations are shown in the table. The total number of shares is 924. The number of observations (column N) corresponds to the number of firm-trading days available. The sample is broken down by settlement method (cash-only or deferred settlement) and inclusion/noninclusion in the CAC40 index for deferred settlement companies. The last columns provide parametric and non parametric tests to compare firms which have repurchased at least once and, respectively, those with no repurchase program and those which adopted a program, but made no repurchases. Volume condition compliance Average (median) maximum repurchase/reference volume ratio halshs-00143974, version 1 -6 Jun 2007 Table 6 : Repurchases during non-trading windows
The sample consists of 352 firms listed on the Paris market which repurchased their own shares during at least one trading day between January 2000 and December 2002. The sample is broken down by settlement method (cash-only or deferred settlement) and inclusion/non-inclusion in the CAC40 index for deferred settlement shares. The sum of the number of shares in the three subpanels is higher than 352 because some shares changed market type during the period. The non-trading window is the 15 calendar days prior to the result publication date. 1,186 dates of results announcements have been analyzed. Panel A shows the results for the total sample. The first category, "no announcement date available" covers firms for which no result publication date could be found in the press. The second category, "no repurchase during non-trading windows", covers firms whose result announcement dates are available, but for which no repurchase was detected during the 15-day periods prior to those dates. The third category covers firms for which at least one repurchase took place during a non-trading window. 
